Charles L. Glaser is professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. His research focuses on international relations theory and international security policy.
Professor Glaser’s book, Rational Theory of International Politics was published by Princeton University Press in 2010. His research on international relations theory has focused on the security dilemma, defensive realism, the offense-defense balance, and arms races, including most recently “When Are Arms Races Dangerous?” in International Security (2004). His recent publications on U.S. nuclear weapons policy include “Counterforce Revisited” (with Steve Fetter), International Security (2005), and “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy” (with Fetter) International Security (2001). Professor Glaser’s work on American Cold War nuclear weapons policy culminated in his book, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton 1990).
Professor Glaser holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received a BS in Physics from MIT, and an MA in Physics and an MPP from Harvard. Before joining the George Washington University, Professor Glaser was the Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Deputy Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He has also taught political science at the University of Michigan; was a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford; served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon; was a peace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace; and was a research associate at the Center of International Studies at MIT.
Correspondence: The Limits of Damage Limitation International Security, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Summer 2017), pp. 193-207.
Getting Out of the Gulf Foreign Affairs. Vol. 96, No. 1 (January/February 2017)
The Role of Effects, Saliencies and Norms in U.S. Cyberwar Doctrine Journal of Cybersecurity (June 15, 2016)
Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward China, International Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 49-98.
A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation, International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49-90.
How Oil Influences U.S. National Security, International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Fall 2013), pp. 112-146.
Why Unipolarity Doesn’t Matter (Much) , Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 135-147.
Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New Missions, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126.
When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming, International Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 44-84.
Structural Realism in a More Complex World, Review of International Studies(2003), 29, pp. 403-414.
National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, International Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92.
The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.
Taking Offense at Offense-Defense Theory, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-1999), pp. 179-206.
The Flawed Case for Nuclear Disarmament, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 112-128.
What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.
The Security Dilemma Revisited, World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201.
Current Gains and Future Outcomes, International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 186-197.
Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.
Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe, International Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50.
Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models, World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538.
Nuclear Policy without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet Era, International Security, Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 34-78.
Do We Want the Missile Defenses We Can Build? International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 25-57.
Why Even Good Defenses May be Bad, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1984), pp. 92-123.
ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures are Worse Than the Disease, International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.