Director Glaser

Charles L. Glaser is professor of political science and international affairs and director of the Elliott School’s Institute for Security and Conflict Studies. His research focuses on international relations theory and international security policy.

Professor Glaser’s book, Rational Theory of International Politics was published by Princeton University Press in 2010. His research on international relations theory has focused on the security dilemma, defensive realism, the offense-defense balance, and arms races, including most recently “When Are Arms Races Dangerous?” in International Security (2004). His recent publications on U.S. nuclear weapons policy include “Counterforce Revisited” (with Steve Fetter), International Security (2005), and “National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy” (with Fetter) International Security (2001). Professor Glaser’s work on American Cold War nuclear weapons policy culminated in his book, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton 1990).

Professor Glaser holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He received a BS in Physics from MIT, and an MA in Physics and an MPP from Harvard. Before joining the George Washington University, Professor Glaser was the Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Deputy Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago. He has also taught political science at the University of Michigan; was a visiting fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford; served on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon; was a peace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace; and was a research associate at the Center of International Studies at MIT.

Articles

Correspondence: The Limits of Damage Limitation P D F file icon International Security, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Summer 2017), pp. 193-207.

Getting Out of the Gulf Foreign Affairs. P D F file icon Vol. 96, No. 1 (January/February 2017)

The Role of Effects, Saliencies and Norms in U.S. Cyberwar Doctrine P D F file icon Journal of Cybersecurity (June 15, 2016)

Should the United States Reject MAD? Damage Limitation and U.S. Nuclear Strategy Toward ChinaP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Summer 2016), pp. 49-98.

A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and AccommodationP D F file icon International Security, Vol. 39, No. 4 (Spring 2015), pp. 49-90.

How Oil Influences U.S. National Security,P D F file icon  International Security, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Fall 2013), pp. 112-146.

Defending rtip, without Offending UnnecessarilyP D F file iconSecurity Studies, Vol 20, Issue 3 (August 2011), pp. 469-489.

Why Unipolarity Doesn’t Matter (Much) , P D F file iconCambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 2011), pp. 135-147.

Will China’s Rise Lead to War? Foreign Affairs 90, no.2 (March/April 2011), pp.80-91. P D F file icon

Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review’s New MissionsP D F iconInternational Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84-126.

When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal ArmingP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Spring 2004), pp. 44-84.

Structural Realism in a More Complex WorldP D F file iconReview of International Studies(2003), 29, pp. 403-414.

National Missile Defense and the Future of U.S. Nuclear Weapons PolicyP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Summer 2001), pp. 40-92.

The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races, P D F file iconAnnual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.

Taking Offense at Offense-Defense TheoryP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Winter 1998-1999), pp. 179-206.

The Flawed Case for Nuclear DisarmamentP D F file iconSurvival, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 112-128.

What is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure it?P D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.

The Security Dilemma RevisitedP D F file iconWorld Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201.

Current Gains and Future OutcomesP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 186-197.

Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-HelpP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), pp. 50-90.

Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for EuropeP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Summer 1993), pp. 5-50.

Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence ModelsP D F file iconWorld Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538.

Nuclear Policy without an Adversary: U.S. Planning for the Post-Soviet EraInternational SecurityP D F file icon Vol. 16, No. 4 (Spring 1992), pp. 34-78.

Do We Want the Missile Defenses We Can Build? International SecurityP D F file icon Vol. 10, No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 25-57.

Why Even Good Defenses May be BadP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Autumn 1984), pp. 92-123.

ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures are Worse Than the DiseaseP D F file iconInternational Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.